Summary: Despite the importance of the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in European integration
Introduction
The European Court of Justice (hereinafter the ECJ or the Court) has been, at least until the mid-1980s, the engine of European integra-1 This article is based on a paper prepared for the Workshop Advanced Issues of European Law -European Law in Pre-accession Period: Implementation, Effectiveness and Legal Culture -4 th session: 26 February -5 March 2006. It builds upon a previous article by the author, 'When governments go to Luxembourg…: the infl uence of governments on the Court of Justice' (2004) 29 ELR 3, updating it, extending the analysis to new Member States, adding a perspective on candidate countries, and integrating wider theoretical debates.
tion, in particular in the legal domain, where progress was much faster than in the lethargic political sphere. 4 To give but a few examples, the Court has famously constitutionalised the Community legal order, 5 positioning European Community (EC) law at the apex of European legal orders, 6 removing the monopoly of EC law enforcement from Member States or EC institutions to place it in the hands of private actors and national courts, 7 and introducing the protection of fundamental rights as an essential element of this sui generis supranational constitutional order. 8 It has also fostered economic and political integration through its revolutionary Cassis de Dijon ruling, which introduced the principle of mutual recognition, 9 thereby boosting the free movement of goods in the European territory and forcing the political process into adopting more effi cient and supranational decision-making rules. 10 Moreover, the Court, before even the introduction of citizenship provisions in the European Union Treaty adopted at Maastricht in 1992, had already begun to develop its own understanding of Union citizenship and of its consequences. 11 It has now taken the concept further than envisaged by many, including the Masters of the Treaty, i.e. the Member States' government. ' (1989) 26 CML Rev, 595. 6 The ECJ established the doctrine of supremacy of EC law, including secondary EU legislation, even over national constitutional provisions. See In brief, the ECJ has created its Constitution for Europe, and this much before Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing inaugurated what was to become the European Convention, 13 much before the Member States painfully agreed on the curiously named "Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe", 14 and much before the awakenings of the French and Dutch peoples to the "harsh reality" of European integration. 15 At the time of writing, the adoption of the constitutional treaty is on stand-by, following national ratifi cation problems sparked by the French and Dutch voters, and causing the disarray of many political actors or observers. Lawyers, for their part, are not so distraught. Of course, most supported the constitutional treaty, if not so much for its substance, at least for the increased democratic nature and legitimacy it brought into the European integration process. 16 However, they are not so upset about the failure of "the Constitution," because as far as they are concerned, the European "constitutional charter"
17 already exists and is permanently moulded and consolidated by the Court.
With the initial euphoria that surrounded the drafting, adoption and ratifi cation of the constitutional treaty, many (including the author of this article) predicted and noted the adoption by the Court of a low profi le, in particular in relation to issues discussed in the Convention or the following Intergovernmental Conference. 18 However, the failure of the political constitutional process has brought the Court back under the spotlight, and back on stage. Some of its recent judgments show that the Court will not hesitate to pick up some issues where the politicians left them, and develop them according to its own certaine idée de l'Europe, 19 which is not always the one favoured by national governments or electorates! This pre-eminent role of the ECJ in the integration process, 20 which certainly holds comparison with that of the US Supreme Court, is, surprisingly, not matched by a great deal of attention on the part of political actors and academics alike.
21 This is particularly shocking if one looks at research carried out on the other side of the Atlantic and on judicial decision-making, in particular that of the US Supreme Court. More specifically, socio-legal research on litigation outre-Atlantique has shown that actors with active litigation strategies, important human and fi nancial resources, familiarity with judicial processes and links with institutions (i.e. "Repeat Players") are more likely to impact on legal change in the long term than reactive, isolated, and inexperienced actors endowed with limited resources and contacts (i.e. "One-Shotters"). 22 The application and testing of this hypothesis in the EU context are limited.
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Lawyers and legal scholars do pay attention to ECJ decision-making, but they are far more interested in the substance than in the process. Judicial decision-making in the ECJ is still largely neglected, 24 and this despite repeated calls for more academic interest. 25 If at all touched upon, it is in relation to the constitutional dialogue taking place between national courts and the ECJ and its normative dimensions. 22 For a seminal article on the subject, see M Galanter, 'Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change' (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95. 23 However, for some reference to the concept of Repeat Players and use of it in the EU judicial process, in relation essentially to private actors and EU institutions, see C Harlow, 'Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice ' (1992) More particularly, European Union (EU) litigation, as one dimension of European judicial decision-making, is a subject-matter which deserves more attention from both academics and practitioners, following in the footpath of US political and sociolegal scholarship. Most of the scarce legal literature on EU litigation concentrates on the activities of interests or corporate groups, or that of some EU institutions, and neglects that of Member States' governments. 27 The few works that address governments' representation before the ECJ are either outdated, country-specifi c, or lacking theoretical foundations or outcomes.
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As to political scientists, whilst many have written on the roles and powers of governments within the EU legislative and Treaty reform processes, few have tackled the question of their infl uence on decision-making in the European Court of Justice. And amongst those, none gives signifi cant attention to governmental litigation as a signifi cant means of infl uence. European integration (EI) theorists, however, did pay some attention to the process of integration by judicial fi at. 29 Analysing the relationship between the ECJ and Member States, these scholars' conclusions vary depending on their theoretical allegiances. Neofunctionalists consider that, although governments are the offi cial 'Masters of the Treaty' and creators of the Court, they are unable to control the Court's integrative activities. The reasons advanced for this lack of control are: (a) the law acting as 'a mask and shield' for politics, (b) the support of the Commission, national courts and private -in particular corporate -players, all pursuing their own interests in a way which serves the purpose of further integration, and (c) governments' lack of effi cient means of control over judicial activism. 30 Intergovernmentalists, for their part, take the opposite view. They consider that, overall, the Court acts consistently with (powerful) Member States' preferences, within the limits allowed by legal reasoning. This is so because governments have suffi cient means of control over the Court (e.g. technique of political appointment, imposition of budgetary restrictions, curtailment or limitations of the Court's powers or jurisdictions, reversal of adverse judicial decisions through Treaty or legislative amendments, limitation of judicial discretion through more restrictive drafting of legal instruments, etc.).
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The turn to new institutionalism in EI studies has brought into the picture more informal means of infl uence, such as non-compliance with judicial decisions, precedents as path-dependencies or normative pressures. that governments -the "principals"-may have "weak" informal means of control, such as litigation or participation in judicial proceedings, over the Court -their "agent". 33 However, they do not develop this thesis further. Despite the recent trend in new institutionalist studies towards constructivist approaches, focusing on the power of ideas, discourse, and social learning on European integration, no thorough research has yet been carried out on how governments or, for that matter, other actors, may use litigation as a discursive tool to infl uence EU judicial developments, and therefore law and policy-making in the EU. 34 Studies of the process of Europeanisation do analyse the way Member States react to European integration. 35 Although litigation must be seen as constituting one aspect of governments' EU strategy, research on Europeanisation still focuses on the political process and neglects the relevance of the judicial one. Thus, these studies deal with the executive or administrative adaptation of Member States or the coordination of governments' EU policies, in relation only to Council work or Treaty reform, and not to governments' involvement in EU litigation. One can nevertheless learn from these studies, in particular the literature which examines the degree of domestic coordination, to the extent that it considers the quality of such coordination as determinant of governments' ability to infl uence EU policy-making. This article, based on an extensive comparative empirical research, 37 combining both qualitative and quantitative methods, and adopting a resolutely interdisciplinary approach to judicial decision-making, makes use of the fi ndings of US sociolegal scholarship on litigation to analyse governments' litigation in a way which contributes to current theoretical understandings of judicial decision-making in the European Union, and more widely the phenomena of European Integration (EI) and Europeanisation. It identifi es, describes, compares and analyses governments' EU litigation strategies, in order to develop an understanding of whether and how governments can infl uence EU case law developments through litigation. In doing so, it throws some light onto an unknown area of governments' EU policy neglected by Europeanisation studies, and contributes to existing new institutionalist debates in EI studies, by offering a sociological institutionalist explanation of integration by judicial fi at. Finally, this article, although not aiming at making a normative contribution, will nevertheless end with an evaluation of the desirability of governmental participation in ECJ proceedings, in the light of democracy, legitimacy and effective decision-making concerns, and in the context of a pluralist European legal order.. This article adopts a wide understanding of litigation, comprising not only the bringing of direct actions against other Member States (Articles 227-228 EC) or EU institutions (Articles 230, 232 or 288.2 EC) or defence against such actions (Articles 226 and 228 EC), but also participation in judicial proceedings by means of "interventions" (Article 40 ECJ Statute) 38 in direct actions involving other parties or by means of "observations" (Article 23 ECJ Statute) 39 in preliminary reference procedures (Articles 234 EC and 35.1 EU). It focuses nevertheless on one particular aspect of this litigation, which consists of governments' observations in preliminary reference proceedings, and this for various reasons. This procedure, which enables national courts to suspend domestic proceedings to request from the ECJ a ruling on the interpretation of EC or EU law or concerning the legality of EC secondary legislation, has developed into a signifi cant means for individuals, with the support of national courts, to 37 The fi ndings presented in this paper regarding governments' participation strategies are the result of empirical research, based on interviews with governments' agents and questionnaires fi lled in by these agents, supplemented by information gathered from reports, journal articles and book chapters written by agents. The paper also analyses the result of a statistical study of governments' participation in preliminary rulings proceedings (1995-1999 and 2005 challenge domestic legislation incompatible with EC (and even now EU law). It also offers the possibility to challenge EU legislation for incompatibility with the treaties, general principles of EU law, or international law. As such, it is an important instrument of both integration and disintegration. 40 Moreover, such proceedings constitute the bulk of the ECJ caseload and results in most of its landmark decisions. It therefore deserves particular attention.
Governments' litigation strategy: from neglect to governmental activism
For many years, Member States' governments largely ignored participation in ECJ proceedings as a tool for infl uence. Their litigation activity was essentially limited to their defense in direct actions and, possibly, participation in preliminary reference procedures emanating from their own courts. Stein, in his early landmark article on integration by judicial means, emphasised the lack of governmental mobilisation around what were to become landmark Community cases. 41 This attitude has now changed, and many governments, although not all of them, have engaged in active litigation strategies before the ECJ.
This initial lack of governments' interest is surprising. Indeed, one would have thought that powerful and resourceful Member States would want to use this additional means to put their print on the process of European integration. Moreover, less powerful Member States would have been expected to turn to the Court as a most favoured arena, since the Court is the only EU law-making institution 42 where the principle of equality between states applies. This state of affairs is even more puzzling when one realises that governments had secured for themselves a privileged position in judicial proceedings before the Court. 42 Few nowadays contest that the Court, in its activity of judicial interpretation provided for by Article 220 EC, de facto creates law. 43 Governments share with the Commission the possibility to bring a Member State before the Court for failure to comply with Community law (Article 227 EC). Also, like some Community institutions such as the Commission and the Council (but not yet the European Parliament), governments are 'privileged applicants' with automatic standing, dispensed from having to show a particular interest in judicial review (Article 230 EC) or failure to act (Article 232 EC) proceedings. Moreover, governments, like EU institutions, are 'privileged participants'; they have the right to intervene in all direct actions (Article 40 ECJ Statute) and to participate in all preliminary references proceedings (Article 23 ECJ Statute) brought before the Court, alongside the parties in the case. This situation has been criticised by some, for it imposes a strong governmental and institutional infl uence over EU judicial proceedings, which is only counterbalanced by that of important corporate interests (Harlow, There may be various explanations for this initial neglect. It may be the result of an overall lack of governments' understanding of the nature of the ECJ decision-making process. 44 This itself could be the consequence of a -still persistent -continental belief in Montesquieu's myth portraying the judge as the "mouth of the law," 45 and therefore incapable of infl uencing its formation. It may also be related to the lesser importance granted to case law in continental legal systems (as compared to common law ones), or the lack of familiarity of European governmental organs with using litigation as a means for pressure. In addition, it must be noted that, for decades, governments largely controlled the legislative procedure (due to unanimity voting in the Council following the 1966 Luxembourg Agreement and the lack of European Parliament involvement), as well as the Treaty reform procedure (through Intergovernmental Conferences). This meant that, not only did they not feel the need to invest in the "alternative" judicial arena, but also they did not care so much about potential adverse judgments, for they probably felt that, should they arise, they could always reverse these judicial decisions by legislative or Treaty amendments. Finally, governments may have been under the impression that they could always ignore adverse ECJ decisions. Indeed, until recently, there were no serious sanctions provided for non-respect of ECJ rulings at EC level (Articles 226-228 EC before the Maastricht Treaty). Furthermore, some domestic courts did not always take it upon themselves to enforce EC law and ECJ decisions against their own legislative or executive authorities (e.g. the French Council of State until the Nicolo case of October, 20, 1989).
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Nevertheless, with the extension of the competencies of the EU at the expense of those of the Member States, the pressure for EU coordination at intergovernmental level is mounting to enable governments, if they so wish, to keep a grasp on policy-making in a wide range of areas. Furthermore, the rising national salience of EU policy increases the pressure on governments to be seen to be "doing something" to protect important national values or interests at EU level. Moreover, with governments' diminishing infl uence both over the Treaty reform process (due to a more inclusive and less state dominated Treaty reform procedure), 47 n 23) This privileged position of governments and EU institutions is also amplifi ed by their entitlement to be represented in court by both an agent and an adviser or lawyer, while private parties must rely on a qualifi ed lawyer (Article 19 ECJ Statute, n 38). and over the legislative process (resulting from a greater involvement of the European Parliament and the rise of qualifi ed majority voting in the Council since the 1986 Single European Act), governments have now greater incentives to turn to the Court, which becomes an increasingly attractive alternative forum to bear infl uence on law-making in the EU. In addition, with national courts increasingly enforcing ECJ decisions, and the introduction in 1992 (new Article 228 EC), and enforcement since July 2000, 48 of the possibility for the Court to impose fi nes on Member States disobeying its rulings, it is now crucial for governments to avoid adverse judgments in the fi rst place. Finally, another determinant factor of governments' participation is their acknowledgment of the transformation of the preliminary references procedure into an important means to challenge incompatible national laws, policies and practices. They also understand that it provides the framework for creative interpretations of Community law or for the identifi cation of constitutional general principles, which tend to further European integration. All these reasons, and probably others, have incited more governments to engage in more active, and even activist, participation strategies.
Member States' governments' participation strategies can be evaluated on the basis of the statistical patterns of observations, the existence -or lack thereof -and the nature of the criteria used for deciding to submit observations, and the general governmental procedure available to organise participation in ECJ proceedings.
It is useful to examine statistical patterns to fi rst identify potential Repeat Players (RPs), through the frequency or themes of their observations, and then look for more qualitative elements that explain the fi ndings. The statistics regarding observations in Article 234 EC proceedings reveal that some governments are defi nitely more active that others, as they submit a much greater number of observations. In the mid to late 1990s, these governments were those of France (1), the United-Kingdom (2), Germany (3), Italy (4), the Netherlands (5), Spain (6) Greece (7), and Austria (8). This order has changed since. Nowadays, the biggest providers of observations are the Netherlands (1), Germany (2), the United Kingdom (3), France (4), Austria (5), Greece (6), Italy (7) and Belgium (8). 49 One must note the improved performance of the Netherlands and Austria, and, on the contrary, a loss of speed in the French participation.
However, the simple fact that these Member States submit many observations does not necessarily mean that all of them have a pro-active litigation strategy. In fact, some governments, such as those of Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium (and in the past Italy) are, to some extent, simply reacting to their domestic courts initiating many preliminary proceedings, 50 in which they feel obliged to participate. 51 Besides, frequent observations do not systematically equal greater infl uence, for observations, to be infl uential in a decision-making process such as the judicial one, must also be convincing, opportune and consistent. As an illustration, it has been alleged by French authorities themselves that the past French policy of "having something to say on every question" undermined the visibility of French priorities and may not be the most cost-effi cient use of litigation resources. 52 It seems that France has since acted upon this criticism by becoming more selective in its participation.
An interesting indicator of an active litigation strategy is the proportion of observations submitted in references from domestic courts. The combination of a relatively high number of observations with a relatively low number of these being submitted in "national" cases can signal an active yet selective, and therefore more effective, litigation strategy. This combination of factors places Finland, Greece, France, Italy and Austria in the leading pack. 53 One must note a policy change in Italy, which used to submit most of its observations in national cases. Nowadays, the Italian government is much more selective in its participation, and does not take part in all Italian cases.
Another interesting statistical pattern relates to the subject matter of the preliminary reference procedure in which Member States submit observations. The statistics reveal that some Member States have thematic priorities in their participation strategy. For example, Scandinavian countries and Austria tend to be very active in environmental matters. It has also been noted that Scandinavian states have launched a litigation campaign for the promotion of transparency in EU political life. 54 The southern countries, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well as France, put a great focus on agricultural issues. France is also very active in the fi elds of public services ("services of general interest" in EU 50 For statistics on requests for preliminary rulings send by Member States to the Court, see the Annual Court Report, Statistic of the Judicial Activity of the European Court of Justice, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm. For 2005, see Table 3 in Appendices. 51 This is not always the case though. The German government, for example, has now moved away from systematic participation in national cases and participates on the basis of the merits of each case and not on its national origin. 52 Commissariat Général du Plan, 'Organiser la politique européenne et internationale de la France' (2002) La Documentation Française, Paris 37. 53 See Table 2 in Appendices. 54 Granger (n 1) . jargon) and in cases dealing with the development of general principles of Community law. Finally, all Member States are particularly active in taxation cases, in particular direct taxation. This is easily understandable when one realises that taxation is one of the last bastions of state sovereignty, and a signifi cant policy tool. Recently, Member States have mobilised signifi cantly around the issue of criminal law, and in particular the "creeping" EU competence in the fi eld, to which development most Member States are strongly opposed.
It is now useful to investigate governments' alleged participation policies, to check to what extent they corroborate the fi ndings above and provide explanations for them. Here one must distinguish between countries which have truly selective participation strategies based only on the merits of the case, and not infl uenced by the national origin of the cases, and those which have selective strategies, but still would almost always participate when the preliminary reference comes from their own courts. In fact, only Germany belongs to the fi rst category, and this can be easily explained by the sheer volume of German references to the Court. This means that the German government has neither the will nor the resources to participate in all these national cases, in addition to foreign ones of interest. Most countries (i.e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands since the mid-1990s, and Belgium in recent years) 55 belong to the second category. Only Luxembourg seems to remain an essentially reactive player. Yet, here again, one must be careful of drawing too hasty conclusions. What could at fi rst sight look like a highly selective participation strategy may simply refl ect a lack of resources, which deprives the governments concerned of the possibility to submit more observations. This is defi nitely a reason behind the selective nature of the German, Dutch and Portuguese strategies, for example. As to the statistical patterns on thematic priorities, they are confi rmed by the priorities identifi ed by the governments' agents involved in EU litigation activities.
Further refi ning can be achieved by looking at the human, material, and organisational resources that governments allocate to EU litigation. This assists in detecting those who really take litigation seriously, as opposed to merely pretending to.
Human, material and organisational resources: real mobilisation or a mere fl ash in the pan?
One would expect governments which have opted for active EU litigation policies to allocate suffi cient resources to achieve their aims. Thus, 55 No information was provided for Ireland and Italy.
we can suspect that countries with small litigation agencies, in particular if these have been granted both the tasks to coordinate the internal decision-making procedure and to draft and present observations, do not mobilise resources up to the level of their ambitions. 56 For example, while most Member States, even the small and medium-sized ones (such as Finland, Austria, Greece, or Sweden) have medium or even large litigation agencies, Germany or Belgian, for instance, have relatively small agencies in comparison to the large workload. This under-endowment leads them to outsource some of the litigation activity to external lawyers (still in only 10-15% of the affairs). Of course, one could argue that the United Kingdom and Ireland outsource most of their EU litigation activity. However, in their case, it is not the result of human or fi nancial resources shortages, but of a deliberate policy of using private barristers for their participation in EU litigation. The outsourcing is to some extent based on the willingness to use the best lawyers to present their case to the Court. Some of the barristers hired to represent the United Kingdom before the ECJ are amongst the top barristers in the country.
Despite their ambitions and the mobilisation of signifi cant human and material resources, some governments may not be able to act as RPs, simply because their internal decision-making and coordination structures are not suited or effi cient enough for the purpose of participation in EU litigation. And vice versa, some Member States may compensate for a lack of resources by effi cient coordination. Differences in administrative organisation are not as such signs of strengths or weaknesses, and may result from historical evolution, administrative traditions, state structure (e.g. a federal system), domestic perceptions of EU matters, political balances, state size, and so on. Yet, both Europeanisation and litigation studies suggest that effi cient decision-making, fast and informed position determination, and strong coordination are likely to produce a greater impact on decision-making processes. Countries endowed with these attributes therefore start in pole position.
In most countries, the litigation agency is also the coordinating body, although some have entrusted the task of coordinating EU litigation to the organ dealing with the national coordination of general EU policies (e.g. France) or EU law (e.g. the Netherlands). Some countries, however, do not have in place a proper coordinating body or even any formal coordination mechanism (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, and Italy). The existence of an effi cient coordinating structure is thought to improve the consistency of submissions, and overall of the "national" EU position, as well as the technical and legal quality of observations, and therefore their potential impact. As to the choice of the ministerial location of both the coordination and litigation agencies, this can reveal something about the level and nature of the cooperation achieved. Most countries place their litigation agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (except Ireland and the UK which systematically resort to external lawyers acting under instruction from the Governments' in-house Legal Services; Austria, which grants it to the Federal Chancellery, and Germany, which puts it under the responsibility of the Finance Ministry). Europeanisation literature suggests that endowing a special inter-ministerial organ, a specifi c and powerful ministry, or the Cabinet Offi ce with the responsibility for litigation is likely to produce stronger positive coordination than when the task in left to the MFA.
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In terms of the persuasiveness of observations, one can safely assume that observations drafted and presented by lawyers with extensive EU law knowledge (in addition to knowledge of the national law) and versed in EU litigation are more likely to "make a good impression" on the Court. This is more likely to be the case where a well-staffed litigation agency drafts the observations and prepares the pleadings in strong collaboration with experts from the technical ministries concerned or/and the coordinating organ (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, more recently, Belgium). Still, in some Member States (e.g. Luxembourg, and to some extent Portugal), observations are drafted by agents in the ministry "most concerned", or by an external lawyer contracted on an ad hoc basis, with sometimes too little additional in-put. As the departmental lawyer may not be very familiar with the peculiarities of the EU judicial process (except where the department is often exposed to EU litigation, i.e. Competition or Agriculture), this is likely to undermine the impact of the observations on the Court. In addition, governments' interests may not always be properly presented by external lawyers. Overall, this could lead to the national position lacking coherence in the longer term. Finally, amongst governments relying on a litigation agency, the more the activity of the agency is focused on EU litigation (e.g. in Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Spain to some extent), the more it is expected that its agents will be able to argue effectively before the Court.
Although various other aspects of governments' litigation strategies could be examined, this preliminary inquiry already provides us with clues as to which governments are RPs in EU litigation. 58 The leading pack now consists of the governments of the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Greece. The middle group brings together Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Italy. And behind lies Luxembourg. There has been some evolution over time, and some countries have signifi cantly improved their position. Italy, for example, has moved from a weak participant to a more active and more strategic one. The French government, whose allocation of resources to EU litigation was considered as insuffi cient in the past, has reacted and set up a more -perhaps too?-active policy. 59 It has redressed the balance in recent years around a sounder and more selective participation strategy. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, the Dutch government completely reorganised its litigation strategy and operation following an unexpected and damaging 1996 ECJ ruling. The growing yet selective participation of this government over the following years is very noticeable in the statistics, despite limited human resources. Recently, the Belgium government has also pulled itself together and has improved its internal procedure and resources for litigation, and has therefore moved up from the bottom to the middle category. The call of J.-V. Louis in the late 1980s for more resources and better organisation for EU litigation has fi nally been heard by this government. 60 Finally, Austria has confi rmed its good start in participation in ECJ procedures.
It is now time to turn to the new Member States. Based on the information provided in January 2006 by the Court, Poland appears to have made a head start, with already 31 written observations to its credit, followed by the Czech Republic (13), Slovakia (9), Hungary (8), Lithuania (6), Cyprus (6), Latvia (2) and Slovenia (2). Malta and Estonia have not yet submitted any written observations. It is diffi cult to draw conclusions at this early stage, but some observations may be made on these results. First of all, a slow start was to be expected, due to the fact that it would take some time for the new Member States' preliminary references to reach the Court and trigger reservations from the governments of these newcomers. The number of Polish observations does not come as such a surprise, considering the size and political importance of the country. The performance of Slovakia and Cyprus, however, is remarkable in the light of their smaller size. The activity of the Hungarian government, however, with only eight observations, is more puzzling, considering that Hungarian courts have been extremely active in dialoguing with the ECJ by sending fi ve out of the seven preliminary references send by new Member States' courts. Additional enquiry into the new Member States' intra-governmental organisation and EU litigation strategies are thus necessary to complement the analysis. Two new Member States have, so far, provided information on their EU litigation strategy: Hungary and Latvia.
As noted, Hungary has only submitted a disappointing number of eight observations since its accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. However, whether by coincidence or by learning, Hungary seems to have adopted most of the attributes of an RP. It has a specialised agency, the "Unit for the Court of Justice Affairs," located within a powerful Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, which deals with general EU coordination through its "Department for the EU" in collaboration with the newly created inter-ministerial organ, the "Interdepartmental Committee for European Coordination" (ICEC). What may be holding it back is the lack of human resources (although this is not mentioned as a problem by the Hungarian agent). Indeed, for the moment, the Unit has only one lawyer working full time on litigation, which is very limited considering the daunting workload (but other -higher-ranking -personalities may be called to participate, depending on the importance of the case).
The second new Member State which participated in the study is Latvia, which has submitted only two observations. First of all, one must note that the Latvian government, whilst setting up its internal procedure and policy for participation in EU judicial proceedings, looks for inspiration to other Member States. As in many new Member States, the agency responsible for participation in ECJ proceedings, the Department for the European Court of Justice, is located within the Ministry of Justice. This seems to result from the fact that in the pre-accession period, this Ministry was in charge of the implementation of the acquis communautaire and that this coordination role in EU legal matters remained after accession to the EU. At the moment, the offi ce has a limited staff (three legal agents and a coordinator). However, the government is discussing increasing the legal staffi ng of the agency or introducing the possibility to hire external lawyers for specifi c cases, to improve the quantity and quality of Latvia's representation in the Court. The importance of the litigation activity is thus taken seriously. One of the main problems with the current internal procedure is the fact that the decision to submit observations must be made at high political level, which is lengthy and reduces the amount of time available to lawyers to prepare the observations. Indeed, it is the ministry competent for the subject matter that fi rst makes a proposal to submit observations. This proposal is passed on to the agency for advice. Following this, the proposal and the agency advice are transmitted to the Minister of Justice who makes a decision as to whether to participate or not. However, this decision must still be approved by the Cabinet, to which it is presented by the Senior Offi cial on EU Questions. All this takes about a month, which leaves the agency, in collaboration with the competent ministry, less than one month to prepare the observations. In most cases, it would nevertheless start working earlier, before having received the go-ahead, in order to save time. This unnecessary lengthy procedure is perceived as problematic, and discussions are under way to simplify and shorten it. Latvia does not have a specifi c litigation policy. Decisions on participation are made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the importance of the national (legal, economic and political) interests at stake, and where very important issues of EU policy are involved. Participation is necessarily selective, due to still limited resources. Latvia therefore seems to take EU litigation seriously, but, as it is still in a trial and observation stage, its participation does not appear to have kicked off ... yet.
It would be interesting to have access to further qualitative information on the more active new Member States, such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia. In the meanwhile, we are forced to consider that overall, apart from these three countries, the new Member States are not yet versed in using litigation as a means to infl uence the development of EU case law. One can only urge them to react and to set up adequate governmental procedure and strategies to make the most of their new membership, and to ensure a balanced representation of perspectives in the Court, which at the moment is dominated by the old Repeat Players identifi ed above.
This inertia in the fi eld of litigation on the part of a number of new Member States should be noted by current candidate countries. Internal organisation and resources should be made available so as to be operational on the date of accession to enable these new Member States to make full use of their membership. Not only does the political arena matter, but also legal and judicial affairs, as the old Member States have learnt in the past, often to their cost …
Conclusions
From a practical perspective, this article sheds light on an aspect of EU law-and policy-making processes which is largely unexplored, i.e. ECJ adjudication. In particular, this article should inform the governments' agents involved in litigation or in administrative reform to design or reform governmental agencies, mechanisms and strategies so as to improve governmental input in the development of the EU case law. It should also assist many governmental or non-governmental actors who seek to infl uence EU policy and legal developments by helping them identify the opportunity structures to infl uence judicial decision-making, either through "knowing their enemy," where these are governments with confl icting interests, or through mobilising their government to support their preferences in Court (few governments at this stage consult or are infl uenced by interest groups or NGOs when they participate in EU judicial proceedings).
From a theoretical perspective, this paper, informed by a constructivist view, suggests that informal means of control or, more appropriately, means of infl uence, should not be neglected. Indeed, they are likely to be far more effective than the traditional "political" means of control, in particular when one considers the specifi c nature of EU judicial decision-making (i.e. a strongly institutionalised and routinised, essentially norm-based, persuasive, and argumentative process, to which access is limited to a small number of privileged participants, all members of the same epistemic -i.e. legal -community). This incidentally supports the intergovernmentalist view that Member States keep some control over the Court, but backs up new institutionalist (sociological branch) views as to how this infl uence operates.
In relation to Europeanisation studies, this paper confi rms the already detected trends of both convergence and divergence in the adaptation of national executives, with similar explanations for them. Pressure for convergence comes from the existence of similar challenges and an institutional environment (including a common legal system), mimicry and learning, and socialisation and optimisation. Pressure for divergence results from the variety of policy styles, the different conception of coordination, and political and administrative opportunity structures. Overall, countries identifi ed as Repeat Players in this study are also the ones who tend to have stronger domestic policy coordination with regard to general EU policy, although the Scandinavian countries seem to be more pro-active in litigation than they tend to be regarding general EU policy. This may be linked to the fact that these countries have some of the highest litigation rates in the world. 62 New Member States overall appear to take EU litigation seriously, but have not necessarily set up appropriate internal coordination structures and policies, and mobilised resources, to tackle it effectively.
Finally, although this article pursues an explanatory rather than a normative aim, it is worth stressing the importance of all Member States' participation in the harmonious development of European Union law through their contribution in EU judicial proceedings.
63 This is particularly the case for ECJ proceedings, since its docket is largely monopolised by powerful and organised interest groups, which are not representative of society at large. 64 The participation of governments may provide, at times, an effective counterweight to these very specifi c interests. 65 It may well be that the current re-balancing by the ECJ of economic and fundamental rights, 66 or its re-assessment of the lawfulness of national provisions constituting barriers to trade if they pursue recognised public interest objectives, may be connected to the increase in governmental activism, in favour of the values previously neglected by the EU legal order. In fact, Scandinavian governments have launched a strong litigation campaign to obtain recognition by the EU legal order of the principles of transparency and openness, and the practical implication, the right of access to documents, as fundamental constitutional principles of the EU (unsuccessful so far, though…!). To those who like to argue that the Court should stay away from political infl uence and that governments should not intervene in the judicial process, I would respond that constitutional decision-making, which constitutes the bulk of the ECJ activity, is political by nature, and that governments, like other important political actors, should have a role to play, if only to inform the Court about the domestic impact of potential outcomes. In many ways, to the extent that governments are domestically accountable, governments act as a "democratic transmission belt" between the European peoples and their Court. Therefore, until further access to the Court is organised for a wider range of representatives of various European public and private interests, perhaps through a proper system of amicus curiae, 67 it is argued that governmental participation in ECJ proceedings should be preserved and even encouraged, by both the Court (which it sometimes does by calling on governments to submit briefs), and the governments themselves. Finally, in a context where legal pluralism is a growing value for the construction of the European legal order, 68 the contribution of governments to the making of European law by the ECJ is certainly a means through which pluralism can be better promoted and guaranteed. 
